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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELBERT G. BENNETT and MARJORIE C.
BENNETT, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

ARNOLD DEE WHITE and ERMA M.
)
WHITE, his wife, and GENERAL
)
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
)
corporation,
) CASE NO. 9633.
Defendants and Respondents. >
)
__________________________
)
)
)
)
)
v.
)
)
ELBERT G. BENNETT and MARJORIE C.
}
BENNETT, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants. ).)

GENERAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

____________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellants instituted an equity action seeking rescission of a construction contract upon the
ground of fraud, and restitution of moneys paid
thereunder.
Prior to the institution of this action the
General Investment Corporation, as assignee of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

Respondents, filed suit against the Appellants for
the unpaid balance due under the contract assigned.
Pursuant to stipulation, the General Investment
Corporation agreed to abide the outcome of Appellants' rescission action, to the effect that a final
decree for Appellants in said action would also
operate in their favor in the prior suit.
versely, if Respondents prevailed,

Con-

jud~ent

would

be entered in favor of General Investment for the
amount stipulated as a deficiency under the contract.
Consequently, the rescission action was the
only one of the two suits which was brought to
trial.

Throughout this brief "Appellants" will

refer to the Bennetts, plaintiffs in said action,
and "Respondents" will refer to the defendants,
Arnold and Erma White.
Fraud was alleged in two counts.

First,

that White obtained Appellants' signature to a
building agreement prior to substantial completion upon his representation that he would complete, and that at the time he had no intention
-2-
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of completing the construction.

Secondly, that

White fraudulently represented that he would carry
the contract for three and one-half years without
obligating Appellants to deal with any financial
institution.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before an advisory jury.
Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury,
all of which were answered in favor of Appellants.
(R. 381-82).

Respondents moved the Court for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the trial
court, refusing to accept the findings of the jury
dealing with White's intent, granted the motion.
Judgment was entered in favor of Respondents of no cause of action.

In the companion case,

judgment was entered against Appellants in favor of
General Investment Corporation for the sum of
$2,568.39.

The Court denied Appellants' motion

for a new trial.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment
and judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or
that failing, a new trial.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A serious dispute exists between the parties
as to the facts of this case.

Consequently, in

order to enable the Court to properly evaluate
the merits, both sides will be stated.

As this is

an equity action, the Court may evaluate the evidence and may set aside the findings of the trial
court if not supported by the weight of the evidence.
Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142.
A.

Respondents' Factual Contention.
The record, pleadings and all other docu-

ments on file herein, clearly indicate that Respondents regard this case as a clear-cut instance of a
hard-to-please buyer, seeking by any means to avoid
obligations, legitimately incurred, on the basis of

-4-
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mere whim.

Their contentions appear to be summed up

accurately as follows:
The Bennetts approached Mr. White in June of
1960 and paid him $2,000.00 down to build a $30,000.00
house.

Mr. White made no promises or representations

that he would carry the contract once the house was
completed, merely indicating that he would try, and
at all times complied with the Bennetts• request to
furnish specifications so they would have some idea
as to the general plan of construction and the
materials used therein as the building progressed.
It was agreed that the home would be constructed according to plans picked out by the Bennetts,
but that certain minor changes could be made, with
adjustments in the final price to be made at the
date of completion.
The Bennetts moved into the home around
October 25, 1960, at which time only minor elements
of construction had not been completed.

At the time

the final contract was signed, Mr. White agreed that
he would complete the work to be done and fully

-5-
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intended to do so.

All work not completed at the

signing of the contract was of a minor nature J and ,
in addition, all changes from the original plans
had been agreed upon, and a price adjustment had
been made.

(De£. 5.).

Furthermore, says Mr. White,

at the time the final contract was signed on October25,
1960, he had informed the Bennetts that he was not
holding the contract on the house, but had already
made arrangements to assign same to the General
Invesbment Corporation.
A few days after the contract was signed,
the Bennetts telephoned and informed White, quite
unreasonably, that they did not intend to stay in
the house, and complained of some minor failures to
complete construction.

Mr. White, acting as an honor-

able man, attempted on many occasions to complete
the minor items of construction, but for one month
was unable to do so because the Bennetts were never
home.

By White's own testimony (R. 186) and Defend-

ants' Exhibit 5 taken in conjunction therewith, all
deviations from the original plans had been agreed

-6-
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upon and an adjustment in price made, some in favor
of White, others in favor of the Bennetts.
B.

Appellants' View of the Facts.
The facts, as viewed by Appellants, may

be summarized as follows:
Mr. White, representing himself as financially responsible, (R.262) agreed to place Appellants in a home, the original cost of which was to
be $24,500.00, for a downpayment of $2,000.00.

In

order to accomplish the consummation of such an
agreement, Mr. White represented that he would carry
the contract personally for three and one-half years.
This representation was made necessary in view of
Appellants' representation that they would not incur such an obligation if the debt was to be controlled by any financial institution.

(R. 264).

In order to induce Appellants to enter into the
obligation, White made collateral statements of
facts relating to his financial ability to carry
the contract.

(R. 262).

He stated, in answer to

Mr. Bennett's question as to his reasons for being

-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such a good samaritan, that he was "one of three
contractors in the city who could afford to" carry
a contract for a home purchaser.

These representa-

tions were made after Mr. Bennett informed him that
he would not assume such a large obligation if the
contract in his name was to be held by a financial
institution.

Furthermore, Mr. White lulled the

Appellants into a false sense of security throughout by his constant assurances that he personally
was going to carry the contract for three and onehalf years.
Not only did White induce Appellants to enter
the construction agreement by this promise, but he
utilized it for the purpose of asserting his will
throughout in matters relating to material elements
of construction.

For example, he insisted that the

kitchen cabinets be of a material which he claimed
would promote the resale value if he wa.s ever stuck
with the house.

(R. 270).

He represented to Mr. Bennett that the
latter's fear over the condition of a second bathroom
-8-
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being too small, and that he would prefer to remove
the adjoining partitions thereby resulting in only
one large room, were of no consequence, as he was
really the one who had to concern himself with the
proper construction, looking to resale value in the
event he had to take over the home.

(R. 273).

As

will be seen, when testimony showed that the second
bath turned out to be a constructional farce, a
comedy of errors, Mr. White blatantly laid this at
Mr. Bennett's door, saying that the latter insisted
that the shaving mirror be placed over the logical
spot, the washbowl.

(R. 184).

The record shows

that the mirror had to be placed over a window on a
swivel hinge, in order to be over the washbowl, and
that the only other spot that it could have been
located would have been on a wall area over the
toilet.

(R. 284).

Mr. White claims that this was

at Mr. Bennett's insistence.

In other words, Mr.

Bennett is to be blamed for the constructional
error of a man who claims to have been building
homes for over seventeen years!
-9-

(R. 150).

This
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supposedly temporary situation was never corrected
once Respondent obtained the signed contract.
By White's own testimony it is clear that
he realized there was more work to be done on the
home at the time the contract of October 25, 1960,
was signed.

(R. 191).

He claims that the floor of

the lower level was completely finished and that
there was nothing further to be done in this regard.
Yet an analysis of the plans of the house which Mr.
White agreed to follow, unless changed by mutual
agreement, clearly shows that a cement floor with
floor drain was contemplated.

(De£. 1).

That this

omission was not a "minor" element of construction
is established by White's own testimony.

He

stated that to follow the plan would have cost
"thousands of dollars more."

(R. 213-14).

Yet he

later states with amazing inconsistency that he did
not impose an extra charge for the wood floor he
substituted.

(R. 214).

He insists in any event

that he received the Bennetts' permission to make
the substitution.

Yet by his own exhibit,
-10-
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purportedly containing all adjustments made as building progressed, there is no indication that this
change was agreed upon nor that the Bennetts received any credit for the "thousands of dollars"
White saved by his unilateral decision to depart
from the plan.

(Def. 5).

(Both the plans and speci-

fications introduced as Def. 1 clearly show concrete
was called for.)
Mr. White attempts to lightly dismiss this
gross departure from his agreement by insisting at
one stage of the trial that the floor he put in was
much better and cost much more than that demanded by
his own plans and specifications.

(R. 178).

(The

latter statement being grossly inconsistent with
the later remark that the plan called for would
cost thousands more if followed.)
Even if one could assume that the floor put
in by White was usable, as he contends, where the
feature of construction constituted a material part
of the home, it is not the law that the party representing that the construction will be completed
-11-
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according to plan, with no intention of doing so, can
foist his choice upon the other party merely to save
a substantial sum of money for himself.

The princi-

ple is stated in Austin v. Duggan, 162 Cal. App. 2d
580, 328 P. 2d 224, 226, quoting from an earlier decision also dealing with a fraud-rescission situation,
"The representee can rescind where he
obtains something substantially different
from that which he was led to expect. If
one is induced to buy a certain lot of land
by misrepresentation that it contains a vineyard, he need not keep it when he learns that
it contains instead an apple orchard; even
though the lot of land is the eventual lot of
land and although the orchard may be more
valuable than the vineyard which he expected
to get, it is obviously unfair to require him
to keep what he did not bargain for and did
not want."
But the facts do not show that the floor,
knowingly substituted by White, was anything near
the quality that the Bennetts had the right to expect under the agreement.
Appellants' testimony was that the entire
surface was rough and splintery, with wide cracks
between boards allowing cold air to rush in from
the excavation below.

(R. 280, 282).
-12-

In brief it
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rendered the lower level uninhabitable.

White's

testimony is directly contradictory, stating that
it was a fine floor that anyone would be pleased to
have in lieu of that specified in the plans. (R. 194).
The conflict in this testimony is resolved in
favor of Appellants by one of White's own exhibits,
a letter to him from the State Department of Contractors directing him to cover the entire lower
level floor with one-quarter inch plywood.

(Def. 8).

In order to believe White's testimony one
must conclude that the Board of Contractors, arbitrarily and unreasonably, has developed a compulsive mania, whereby all fine floors must be covered
with plywood.

It is more logical to infer that the

flooring was grossly inadequate.
In any event, this was accomplished after,
not before the Bennetts moved out, and was obviously
done at the insistence of the Board of Contractors
and not by any desire of White to fulfill his agreement.

Even if this change had been made previously,

the plywood covering necessary to comply with the

- 13 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

minimum building requirements of the Board did not
satisfy the plans and specifications which White was
required to adhere to.

From his actions and testi-

mony it is clear also that White had no intention
of completing this substantial element of construction as promised at the signing of the October 25
agreement.
With regard to White's promise to carry the
contract personally, he insists that he merely
changed his mind.

In any event, he claims that the

Bennetts were informed of this change of plan at
the time Mr. Homer Jenson of General Investment
visited the prendses prior to October 25.

Mr.

Jenson, whose interests in this suit are directly
opposed to that of the Bennetts, could not recall
that the Bennetts were so informed.

(R. 235).

Futhermore, this is verified by the pleadings in
the case, where General Investment's answer to the
Appellants' complaint states that notification of
the assignment was made after the contract was
signed on October 25.

(R. 29).
-14-
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Two facts stand out with regard to White's
promise not to assign.

First, it is clear that if

he again promised to hold the contract at the signing of October 25, as Appellants maintain, he had
no intention of doing so inasmuch as Mr. Jenson and
White both testified the arrangements to assign had
been made prior to that date.

(R. 233).

Indeed,

the assignment was made the following day. (R. 237,
286).

Furthermore, directly contradictory to
White's testimony to the effect that he could not
recall ever making such promise, other than possibly at the original meeting with the Bennetts, is
the testimony of Mrs. Thomas, an individual having
no interest in the home whatsoever, nor testifying as an employee or relative of either party.

(R. 323).
The Appellants' testimony indicates that,
in spite of Mr. White's assertion that he attempted
to complete the home after October 25 and before
November 25, when rescission was effected, nothing

-15-
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was done in that regard.

Both Mrs. Bennett and Mrs.

Thomas testified that about two weeks before the
Bennetts moved out, White stated that he would have
to be sued in order to get any more work out of him.
(R. 324, 331).

That he meant what he said is veri-

fied by the fact that he complied only with the
orders of the Board of Contractors, and made no
effort to comply with the plans and specifications as
per his obligation.

Further, what work he did do

was accomplished after notice of rescission was
served.

(R. J31).
The record is replete with other elements in-

dicating White's failure to complete his obligations
under the contract.

Cabinets were rough and unfin-

ished, the work around windows was unfinished allowing wind to come into the lower level, the stairway
was flimsy and unsafe and numerous other omission
were present.

(R. 280-83).

While any one or two

of these items may be of little consequence in and
of themselves, taken as a whole they indicate the
lack of interest White had in his obligation once

-16-
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the agreement was signed, in spite of his promise
to complete, and are relevant in determining his
intent.
Admittedly the Bennetts moved into the
house before it was completed.

This was necessary

because of the expiration of the lease at their
former residence.

(R. 279).

Their signing of the

agreement before completion was accomplished as a
courtesy to Mr. White in whom they had been lulled
to trust implicitly.

They relied on his representa-

tions and prc·mses.

They were, as Mr. Bennett testi-

fied, probably foolish in their reliance on White's
word.

This reliance, however, did not spring from

a general gullibility toward the human race in general.

It was carefully developed and nurtured by

White himself.

(R. 284, 332).

He asked for and re-

ceived the confidence and trust of the Bennetts and
then, when he had his paper signed, he cashed in
and in effect, told them to "go fly a kite."
The Appellants contend that in view of the
facts developed at trial, the court erred in refusing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to accept the findings of the jury to the effect
that:
(a)

On November 25, 1960, the day on

which plaintiffs served their notice of rescission upon defendants, White left features
of the construction contract unfinished to
the extent that the house was then substantially not completed.
(b)

On October 25, 1960, at the time

the final contract was signed by the parties,
White dj.d not then intend to substantially
complete the contract.
(c) Between October 25, 1960, and November
25, 1960, White stated to plaintiffs that he
did not intend to do any more work on the
house.

(R. 109).

The trial court refused to accept only the
second finding of the jury as to the intent of White
at the time the final contract was signed.

Accord-

ingly, it may be assumed that the other findings
stand,

~.,

that the home was not substantially

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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complete at the time of rescission and that White
informed the Bennetts prior thereto, but after the
contract was signed, that he did not intend to complete the home.
It is asserted by Appellants that the trial
court was acting under a misconception of the law in
refusing the jury findings with respect to White's
lack of intention to complete the home at the time
the October 25th contract was signed.

Further, it

is urged that the trial court erred in its refusal
to cons) der m.:.e cau.-:;e of action stated by Ap;,ellants
relating to White's promises to hold the contract
for three and one-half years.

Finally, Appellants

wish to point out that the finding of the jury to
the effect that the contract was not substantially
complet~1

at the

ti~e

of rescission was clearly war-

ranted by the evidence, and that the trial court
found no fault with this finding.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE JURY
FINDINGS RELATING TO WHITE'S INTENT WAS BASED
LAW.
Sponsored by the UPON
S.J. QuinneyA
LawMISCONCEPTION
Library. Funding for digitization OF
provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The memorandum decision of the trial court
clearly reveals that if the law of the State of Utah
is correctly stated therein, no action based upon
fraud in this State will ever be successfully prosecuted in the absence of a confession in open court.
The following statement of the trial court illustrates this fact:
"There was no direct evidence that
defendant ••• intended not to complete his
contract when he signed and thereby covenanted to finish the work to be done on
the house. rhere were circumstances
provec5. from_ which inferences could be_
drawn, Appr-1rently the jury drew inL;:-ences and concluded that at the time of
nignit~g the final contract Mr. White
clearly had in his mind the intention
and determination not to perform the
extra work agreed upon to finish the
~."

(R. 115).

Two glaring errors are revealed in the court's
stateme.!:.i:.

First the "extra" work referred to above

was not extra in any sense of the word.

It was

work which White had unconditionally promised and
agreed to perform at the inception of the agreement.
Secondly, the court admits that proven circumstances enabled the jury to draw inferences of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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White's intent, but holds as a matter of law that
such inferences are not warTanted, or to be considered, in the light of respondents' direct testimony of his honest intentions.

We submit that such

has never been the law in this or any other jurisdiction.
The correct rule was aptly stated in
Connolly v. Gishwiller, 162 F.2d 428, 433 (7th Cir.,
1947) (cert. denied 332 U.S. 825) as follows:
"Fraud, in its general sense, comprise:::; all '3.·-:ts, omissions and concealments invol',~tng a breach of legal or
ecr~itable d·uty, trust or confidence and
resulting in damage to another ••• ~
rarely susceptible ~f direct proof, but
must ordinarily be established by circumstantial evidence and legitimate inferences arising therefrom, which taken as a
whole will show the fraudulent intent or
purpose with which the party acted. The
inferences to be gathered from a chain
of circumstances depend largely upon the
common sense knowledge of the motives
and intentions of men in like circumstances."
The Court further erred in assuming that the
"one parcel of evidence" upon which Appellants rely
as indicative of White's intent is that on the day
after the signing Mr. White assigned the contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to General Investment Corporation.

(R. 116).

Al-

though Appellants do indeed consider this to be extremely relevant in laying bare the deceitful machinations of White, a more potent example of his state
of mind may be found in the proven fact that White
did not intend to substantially complete the lower
level of the home according to the plans and specifications.
by White.

This is not an inference; it was admitted
It is an established fact.

He attempted

to explain this action upon the ground that it would
cost him "thousands of dollars more" to abide by his
agreement.

(R. 213-14).

He can point to nothing

in his own prepared statement of "agreed upon"
changes whereby the Bennetts either consented to
such change or were given credit for the "thousands
of dollars" White admittedly saved himself by his
unilateral abandonment of the plans and specifications he was committed to follow.

(Def. 1).

The trial court further concluded that the
fact of respondents' non-performance is not to be
considered in determining the intent of the latter.
-22-
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We do not contest the principle that mere failure to
observe a promise, standing alone, cannot justify a
finding of fraud.

However, the law does not take

the narrow view of the trial court.

Quite the con-

trary, although the failure to perform a promise is
not sufficient to sustain an allegation

of

fraud

standing alone, yet the non-observance of the promise may, when considered with other evidence be
sufficient.

Charpentier v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,

91 N.H. 38, 13 A. 2d 141.

And the fact that a de-

fendent in a fraud action fails to perform a promise is consistent with the assertion that he did
not intend to do so at the time the promise was made.
~

v. Anderson, 198, Okla. 304, 178 P.2d 78..

In

short, if the only evidence of White's fraudulent
intent consisted of his failure to observe a promise, the Appellants would not be before this Court.
The jury, obviously considering the evidence as a
whole, returned a finding of fraudulent intent on
the part of Mr. White.

The trial court obviously

refused to consider the evidence as a whole, the
-23-
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unusual way in which White performed his agreement,
the failure to furnish Appellants with specifications, (R. 332) his utilizing his promise to carry
the contract to assert his will in matters of construction, his arrangements for the assignment of
the contract before the final signing, all the while
representing to Appellants that he would not do so,
as well as the fact that he refused to do any more
work which he was admittedly obligated to do until
compelled by the Board of Contractors.

In this regard

it is also relevant as showing his fraudulent scheme
existed from the beginning to point out that he
charged the Bennetts $200.00 for a commission, paid
to himself on the sale of the lot, plus adding his
margin thereto, in effect resulting in a price of
$7,090.00 for a lot he would have sold them for
$6,500.00 if not built upon.

(De£. 7) (R. 252-54).

In short, the Court ignored the. principle which
states that in a fraud case an unusual way of doing
business may represent an indicia of fraud under the
circumstances.

Allison v. Mildred, (1957) 307 S.W.

2d 447.
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The finding of the jury, in answering the
third interrogatory submitted, clearly indicates
that White intended, and informed the Bennetts that
he so intended, not to finish the agreed upon work.
Such subsequent conduct and statements by White are
clearly relevant in determining whether the fraudulent intent existed at the time the promise was
made.

Foster v.

~,

51, N.D. 581, 199 N.W. 1017.

Referring again to the memorandum decision of
the trial court (R. 118), it is indicated that the
trial judge believes the law to be to the effect
that when a transaction is susceptible of two constructions, the one free from imputation of fraud
must be adopted.

This contention was made on appeal

in Gordon v. Slate, 169 Okla. 381, 37 P.2d 270, 272.
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed a finding of fraud
based upon circumstantial evidence, and in that
regard stated:
"Circumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately considered, may, by
their number and joint operation, especially when corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof of fraud."
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Finally, in this regard, the trial court indicated that the interests of witnesses in the outcome were of about equal weight.

(R. 118).

The

testimony of Mrs. Thomas, indicating a discrepancy
in White's self-serving declarations, appears to
have been disregarded, at least by the trial court
if not the jury.

vJhen such material evidence (testi-

mony of Mrs. Thomas shedding light on the credibility
of White, (R. 318-25) is excluded or not given consideration, the findings of the trial court lose the
weight normally attributed to it in an equity case.
Allison v. Mildred, (1957) 307

s.w.

2d 447.

Further-

more, under the same principle, the findings of the
trial court, as substituted for those of the jury,
should be considered in an even more suspicious
light when it becomes clear that the admissions of
White, himself, to the effect that he did not intend
to complete the lower level according to plans and
specifications because of the additional cost to
him of "thousands of dollars," were completely disregarded by the Court.

This is the "direct" evidence
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of intent the Court complains Appellants failed to
produce.

It comes directly from the mouth of re-

spondent!

Yet it is completely disregarded.

It is submitted that the trial court misconstrued the law relating to proof of fraud and,
in addition, that it failed to take into consideration material evidence establishing Appellants'
right to rescind as a matter of law.
One final example clearly indicates the
trial court mdsinterpreted certain testimony.

The

Court stated that Mrs. Bennett testified the home
was a "luxury dwelling."

The record shows that she

stated in effect it "was to be a luxury dwelling."

(R. 337).
Taking all of the foregoing factors, propositions of law, testimony, and deductions of the
trial court into consideration, it is submitted
that the findings of the jury more clearly represent a responsible and accurate analysis of the
evidence which unfolded during the course of the
trial than those upon which the trial court based

-27-
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its judgment below.

Accordingly, we submit that

the judgment should be reversed as a matter of law.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT
APPELLANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY
ON THE ISSUE OF WHITE'S FRAUDULENT PROMISE
TO CARRY THE CONTRACT AND IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER SAID ISSUE AS A GROUND FOR RESCIS-

SION.
In the second count of their amended com•
plaint, (R. 8-9), Appellants asserted a cause of
action based upon White's fraudulent promise to personally carry the final contract for a four-year
period.

Evidence was taken from which the fact

finder may well have found that, at the time the
final contract was signed, White again asserted this
promise with no intention of performing.

In fact,

the evidence clearly shows that he had already made
arrangements for the assignment before the agreement was executed.
By refusing to give Appellants Instruction
No. 4, the trial court indicated that no consideration was given to this aspect of Appellants' case.
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(R. 81).

The testimony of the Bennetts, supported

by that of Mrs. Thomas, (R. 323) establishes that
White continuously asserted that he would carry the
contract.

Indeed both Appellants testified that the

contract would not have been entered into by them but
for this representation.

Furthermore, their testi-

mony indicates the false sense of security Appellants were lulled into by White's repeated representations of his honesty and sincerity of purpose,
which, taken in conjunction with his promise to
carry the contract himself, allowed him to build
without furnishing specifications, and to increase
the initial proposed estimate of the cost after he
had received the downpayment of $2,000.00.

The fact

finder should take into consideration the difference in building experience and the degree of confidence placed in the seller by a buyer of real
estate when faced with a question of fraud.

~

v. ~, 2 Utah 2d. 101, 269 P.2d 865.
Two possibilities might be advanced for the
refusal of the trial court to consider this aspect
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of Appellants• case.

First, the Court may have

considered the representation to lack materiality.
If so, an obvious error was made.

The applicable

rule is stated in the Restatement of Torts, § 538,
as follows:
"(1) Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact in a business transaction is justifiable if, but only if, the
fact represented is material.
"(2) A fact is material if ••• (b) the
maker of the representation knows that its
recipient is likely to regard the fact as
important although a reasonable man would
not so regard it."
Appellants made it clear to White that they
would not build at the time except for his promise
to carry the contract.

(R. 285, 335).

This clearly

made the representation a material one under the Restatement test.
Nor is it an answer to say that White
changed his mind.

Although in some instances, a

promise to perform in the future, if broken, does
not constitute actionable fraud.
"/_j/f the promise is accompanied with
statements of existing facts which show the
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ability of the promissor to perform his
promise, and without which the promise
would not be accepted or acted upon, such
statements are denominated representations,
and if falsely made are grounds for avoiding the contract though the thing promised
to be done lies wholly in the future."
Russ Lumber & Mill Co. v. Muscupiabe Land &
Water Co., 120 Cal. 521, 52 Pac. 995.
The Russ Lumber theory is clearly applicable
in the case at bar.

White not only promised to

carry the contract personally, but represented as a
presently existing fact his financial position which
made him one of three contractors in the city who
could afford to make such an offer.

As White's pro-

mise was a continuing one, reaffirmed at the October
25 signing, his statement that he was forced to
assign in order to meet his obligations (R. 215)
clearly highlights the falsity of his prior statements concerning his financial picture.
A second possibility for the trial court's
complete disregard of this theory of the case might
be based upon the idea that, even if substantially
all of the elements of fraud were present, there
was no damage suffered by Appellants.

In short,
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they were in the same position whether White or
General Investment was carrying the contract.
One of the witnesses called by Appellants,
Mr. Snarr, was a former F.H.A. inspector.

He was

not allowed to testify as to the fact whether or
not the house, as it stood, would qualify for F.H.A.
financing.

(R. 247).

As the Appellants would be

required to refinance in four years' time, it was
important that this means of financing be available
to them.

Secure in the thought that White would

have some stake in the house for four years and
would be interested in the Appellants obtaining the
necessary financing, they let him proceed with construction without specifications or accounting to
them in any way.

They knew, or believed, that if

any difficulty came up over this at a later date,
he would make it right.

If the testimony of Mr.

Snorr had been allowed, and if it had been to the
effect that F.H.A. would never finance the home as
built , it would be difficult to conceive how one
could say that the fraudulent promise, and their
-32-
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reliance thereon, had not caused Appellants serious
injury and damage.
In connection with the damage question, it
is submitted that a finding of actual monetary damage is not absolutely essential to allow rescission
based upon fraud.
~'

As pointed out in Earl v. Saks &

36 Cal.2d 602, 226, P.2d 340, there is a dis-

agreement among authorities as to what is meant by
"injury" which will justify a rescission.

It need

not be a pecuniary loss but merely a showing that
the injured party did not get substantially what he
bargained for.
The situation is closely analogous to those
cases collected in 48 Harv. L. Rev. 480, 485, wherein
rescission was allowed, with respect to transactions
induced by an agent's misrepresentation of his
principal's identity, even though there was no
economic reason for the unwillingness to deal with
the principal.

The Bennetts agreed to buy if their

dealing would be with White.

They did not wish to

deal with General Investment.

-33-
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We submit that by means of his promise,
White was able to obtain a signed contract, assign
same and obtain his money and then literally walk
off the job.

The substantially uncompleted home, as

found by the jury (this finding was not rejected by
the trial court) certainly establishes sufficient
damage to Appellants to justify rescission.

To say

that Appellants should have sued for damages, when
White himself admitted the home could not have been
made whole without the expenditure of additional
"thousands of dollars" would be a ridiculous contention.

Appellants waited nearly one month for White

to perform before rescinding and by waiting longer
would, by ratification, have lost their right to
rescind.

Indeed, the General Investment Corporation

in its answer, indicates that by waiting two weeks
they had ratified the contract and were relegated to
a suit for damages.

(R. 29).

As stated in the

~

case,

~,

there is,

in many cases, a strong social interest in not having
one intentionally take advantage of another, an
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interest which at times overrides the social interest in the stability of transactions even though
no economic loss was suffered.
In the case at bar there was a clear economic loss, a home that was not substantially complete, a home not built according to agreed upon
plans because the builder would have been forced
to spend thousands of dollars more than he anticipated.

In addition to the wilful failure to com-

plete the home, the case also involves fraudulent
representations, known to be material to the subjective mind of the buyers, with no intention at all
on the seller's part of complying therewith.
The law and social policy condemn this type
of sharp and fraudulent practice.

To allow the

trial court's judgment to stand will be a green
light to those dealing with the public to make the
grossest of representations and, if they are persuasive and capable of gaining the trust and confidence
of those with whom they deal, take their money and
leave them sadder but wiser as they reap their

-35-
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~---~~~,

~~nt~nt

with the thought that their vic-

tim is stuck with his bargain.

CONCLUSION
We submit for the reasons stated herein
that the Court should reverse the judgment and
direct the Court to enter judgment in favor of the
Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

ELBERT G. BENNETT and
MARJORIE C. BENNET,
pro !,!
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